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We introduce skill groups and different production technologies into the Burdett-
Mortensen model of on the job search. Supermodularity of the different skill groups in 
the production process leads to a positive intra-firm wage correlation between skill 
groups. Increasing returns to scale allow the theoretical earnings density to be unimodal 
with a long right tail even in the absence of productivity dispersion. We perform the 
structural estimation the model and evaluate the effect that arises from the marginal 
shift of the skill structure towards larger fraction of high-skilled workers. Our estimates 
of the production parameters demonstrate economy-wide increasing returns to scale. 
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It is generally agreed that the shape of the wage earnings distribution is determined by the
skill distribution of the work force, the ﬁrms’ production technology and the search and
matching frictions that govern the allocation of workers to jobs. The aim of the paper is to
provide a theoretical and still empirically tractable model that takes all these three factors
and their interactions into account. For doing so we extend the search equilibrium model
of Burdett and Mortensen (1998) and derive an explicit functional form for the wage oﬀer
and earnings distributions. Our extension explicitly introduces diﬀerent skill groups that
are linked via a production function which permits either constant or increasing returns to
scale. The extension to diﬀerent skill groups allows for the analysis of ﬁrms’ wage posting
behavior, where ﬁrms simultaneously compete for workers of diﬀerent skill groups.
Since the endogenous wage distribution generated by the original Burdett-Mortensen
model has an upward-sloping density, which is at odds with the empirical observation
of a ﬂat right tail, there has been a lot of eﬀort to extend the original model in order
to generate a more realistic-shaped wage distribution. Mortensen (1990) introduces dif-
ferences in ﬁrm productivity and Bowlus et al. (1995) show that this greatly improves
the ﬁt to the empirical wage distribution. Bontemps et al. (2000) and Burdett and
Mortensen (1998) formulate a closed-form solution for a continuous atomless productivity
distribution, which translates into a right-tailed wage earnings density, depending on the
assumed productivity dispersion. Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) extend this for both
employer and worker heterogeneity.
In the present extension we demonstrate that with skill multiplicity and a production
function that permits any degree of homogeneity we get a unimodal right-skewed wage
oﬀer and earnings densities with a decreasing right tail. Even though we later introduce
productivity dispersion our result about the shape of the oﬀer and earnings densities is true
even for identical employers. While the structural models with continuous productivity
dispersion as suggested by Bontemps et al. (2000) and Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002)
improve the ﬁt to the empirical wage earnings distribution and provide reliable estimates
of the labour market transition rates, they are not informative about the production
parameters governing the productivity dispersion (see Manning, 2003, p.106f). In this
paper diﬀerent production technologies are introduced explicitly. As a result this allows
us to estimate the parameters of the production functions even without using ﬁrms’ data.
In the theoretical part of the paper we demonstrate that whenever skills are comple-
2mentary in the production process we should observe a positive within-ﬁrm correlation
between wages of workers with diﬀerent skills. Positive intraﬁrm wage correlation is a well
established fact, empirical evidence of which are presented in Katz and Summers (1989)
and Barth and Dale-Olsen (2003) among many others. Theoretical consideration of the
issue is performed by Kremer (1993). In his O-ring theory Kremer (1993) also uses a pro-
duction function that exhibits complementarity of the working colleagues’ abilities not to
make a mistake when performing a sequence of tasks in order to complete the ﬁnal good.
One important consequence of the O-ring theory is a positive correlation between wages
and the number of tasks and therefore the overall size of the workforce. However, recently
Barth and Dale-Olsen (2002) have empirically demonstrated that the employer-size wage
eﬀect vanishes once we look at the skill-group size. In view of this result the labour market
frictions approach of this paper that predicts a positive correlation between skill-group
size and wages may be more favorable then the O-ring theory of Kremer (1993).
We use the estimated parameters of our model to analyze whether there is over- or
underinvestment in human capital from a social welfare point of view, i.e. whether the
increase in output coming from educating the marginal individual pays oﬀ the individ-
ual’s and the government’s investment costs. Underinvestment in (undirected) search or
matching models are analyzed by Acemoglu (1996) and Masters (1998). Following Grout
(1984) they provide models where underinvestment results from the fact that search or
matching frictions make it impossible for workers to capture the whole return on their
investment. The same mechanism is at work in the present paper. However, underin-
vestment cannot be attributed to rent sharing solely. In addition it has to be the case
that workers of (potentially) diﬀe r e n ts k i l lh a v et os e a r c hi nt h es a m em a r k e t .A l l o w i n g
for segmented labor markets, where unskilled workers do not search for the same jobs as
skilled workers do (and vise versa), makes both over- or underinvestment into education
possible. The simple idea is that a lower unemployment rate among high skilled workers
can increase the return to human capital investment as shown by Saint-Paul (1996).1
Given these results in the literature we do not endogenize the matching probabilities in
order to show that over- or undereducation can exist. Instead, we assume constant oﬀer
arrival rates and investigate empirically whether over- or underinvestment into skills is
present in the German economy. We ﬁnd that a marginal change in the skill structure
of the labor force towards more high skilled workers does indeed generate an increase in
1Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) show that the hold-up problem can be overcome if workers are able to
direct their search to potentially diﬀerent markets.
3output suﬃcient to overcompensate the society for the additional cost of education to the
marginal individual.
Estimation methodology applied in this paper is based on the one considered in Bowlus
et al. (1995), (2001). However, skill-multiplicity and Cobb-Douglas production function
used in the econometric model impose additional restrictions that must be taken into
account when suiting the original method. First, these are the restrictions that allow
representing the subset of production parameters as a function of search frictions para-
meters and the homogeneity degree of the Cobb-Douglas technology. Second, these are
the identiﬁability restrictions that appear with an introduction of employer heterogene-
ity. Our estimation problem can be also related to that of Bowlus and Eckstein (2002).
Within the simple Burdett-Mortensen model Bowlus and Eckstein (2002) analyze discrim-
ination and skill diﬀerences by allowing for diﬀerent productivity and diﬀerent transition
parameters across races as well as incorporating discrimination of employers. However,
unlike in Bowlus and Eckstein (2002), we estimate the parameters of interest by maximum
likelihood.
The paper proceeds as follows. The theory is presented in Section 2, where we extend
the existing Burdett-Mortensen framework, solve for optimal strategies of workers and
ﬁrms and discuss the properties of the resulting equilibrium wage oﬀer distribution. The
empirical implementation of the model is treated in Section 3. We formulate the appro-
priate likelihood function and discuss the relevant estimation method and identiﬁability
issues. Thereafter, in Section 4, we provide a brief description of the data set and in detail
discuss the result of the structural estimation of the model and present our results about
the underinvestment into education. Section 5 concludes.
2. THEORY
In this section we extend the original Burdett-Mortensen model of search equilibrium by
introducing diﬀerent skill groups and diﬀerent technologies that link the skill groups via
the production function.
2.1 Framework
The model has an inﬁnite horizon, is set in continuous time and concentrates on steady
states. Workers are assumed to be risk neutral and to discount at rate r.E a c h w o r k e r
belongstoaskillgroupi =1 ,2,...,Iwhose measures are deﬁned as qi, satisfying
P
qi = m.
4The measure ui of workers is unemployed and the measure qi − ui is employed. Before
choosing a skill-group workers incur a one-oﬀ cost ci for skill-speciﬁc education. By
assuming perfect capital market workers are able to borrow the cost of education.
Workers search for a job in the skill-segmented labor markets. With probability λi
unemployed workers of skill group i encounter a ﬁrm that makes them a wage oﬀer cor-
responding to their education, and with probability λe employed workers encounter a
ﬁrm.2 Then workers decide whether to accept or reject the job oﬀer. Job-worker match
is destroyed at an exogenous rate δ>0.L a i do ﬀ workers start again as unemployed.
We assume that there exist J distinct production technologies Yj (l(w | wr,F(w))) in-
dexed by j,w h e r el(w | wr,F(w)) is the vector of skill groups li (w | wr
i,F i (w)) employed
by a ﬁrm with technology j. The size li (w | wr
i,F i (w)) of the skill group depends on the
ﬁrm’s wage oﬀer wi, the workers’ reservation wage wr
i and the skill speciﬁcw a g eo ﬀer
distribution Fi(w). We further assume that the production function Yj (l(w | wr,F(w)))
is supermodular in l(w | wr,F(w)), i.e. has increasing diﬀerences in l(w | wr,F(w)) as
deﬁned below, and is twice continuously diﬀerentiable in li (w | wr
i,F i (w)).
Deﬁnition 1: For any l ≡ l(w | wr,F(w)) and l0≡ l
0 (w | wr,F(w)), Yj (l) is supermod-
ular in l,i f
Yj (l∧l
0)+Yj (l∨l
0) ≥ Yj (l)+Yj (l
0),
where l∨l0 ≡ (max(l1,l 0
1),...,max(lI,l 0
I)) and l∧l0 ≡ (min(l1,l 0
1),...,min(lI,l 0
I)).


















where −i denotes the vector of all skill groups except i.
Firms maximize proﬁts by oﬀering a wage schedule w =( w1,w 2,...,wI)=(wi,w−i).
2.2 Workers’ Search Strategy
The optimal search strategy for a worker of occupation i is characterized by a reservation
wage wr
i, where an unemployed worker is indiﬀerent between accepting or rejecting a wage
oﬀer, i.e. Ui = Vi(wr
i),w h e r eUi is the value of being unemployed and Vi(wr
i) the value
of being employed at the reservation wage wr
i. Flow values of being unemployed and











(Vi(xi) − Vi(wi))dFi(xi)+δ(Ui − Vi(wi)) − ci (1b)
respectively, can be solved for a reservation wage3
w
r






r + δ + λe(1 − Fi(x−))
¶
dx.( 2 )
In order to keep the analysis simple, for the remainder of the paper we assume that
r/λi → 0 as done in the original model by Burdett and Mortensen (1998). The wage oﬀer
distribution is given by Fi(w)=Fi(w−)+υi(w),w h e r eυi(w) is the mass of ﬁrms oﬀering
wage w to skill group i.S i n c eo ﬀering a wage lower than the reservation wage does not
a t t r a c ta n yw o r k e r ,w ea s s u m ew i t ho u tl o s so fg e n e r a l i t yt h a tn oﬁrm oﬀers a wage below
the reservation wage, i.e. Fi (w)=0for w<w r
i.
2.3 Steady State Flows and Skill Group Size
Equating the ﬂows in and out of unemployment gives the steady state measure of unem-





Given the assumptions of constant Poisson arrival rates λi, λe and the constant separation
rate δ Mortensen (1999) has shown that skill group size evolves according to a special
Markov-chain known as stochastic birth-death process.
The birth rate of a job oﬀered by a ﬁrm posting a wage w is given by the average
r a t ea tw h i c haj o bi sﬁlled. There are ui unemployed who leave unemployment at rate
λi and (qi − ui) employed workers who leave their current employer at rate λeGi(w−) to
join the ﬁrm oﬀering a wage w,w h e r eGi(w)=Gi(w−)+ϑi(w) denotes the cumulative
wage earnings distribution for skill group i. A worker-employer pair split at rate δ or
a worker receives a higher wage oﬀer from another ﬁrm, which occurs at rate λe,a n d
accepts it, which happens with probability Fi(w) ≡ (1 − Fi(w)). The death rate of a job
is, therefore, given by δ + λeFi(w). Mortensen (1999) shows that the skill group size is
3The details of the derivation can be found in Mortensen and Neumann (1988).
6Poisson distributed with mean
E [li (w | w
r
i,F i (w))] =
λiui + λeGi(w−)(qi − ui)
δ + λeFi(w)
.
Equating the inﬂow and outﬂow gives the steady-state measure of employed workers







E [li (w | w
r
i,F i (w))] =






From (5) it follows that the expected skill group size E [li (w | wr
i,F i (w))] is (i) increasing
in w,i fw ≥ wr
i, (ii) continuous except where Fi (w) has a mass point and is (iii) strictly
increasing on the support of Fi (w) and constant on any connected interval oﬀ the support
of Fi (w). The intuition behind this result is that on-the-job search implies that the higher
the wage oﬀered by a ﬁr mt h em o r ee m p l o y e dw o r k e r sa r ea t t r a c t e df r o mﬁrms oﬀering
lower wages and the less workers quit to employers paying higher wages. This leads
to a higher steady-state skill group size for ﬁrms oﬀering higher wages. For notational
simplicity from now on we use li (w) instead of li (w | wr
i,F i (w)).
2.4 Wage Posting
Each ﬁrm posts a wage schedule w in order to maximize its proﬁt, taking as given the
workers’ search strategy, i.e. the reservation wage vector wr, and the other ﬁrms’ wage
posting behavior, i.e. F (w).
πj =m a x
w E
£




The expectation operator in the equation above is over all possible realizations of the
diﬀerent skill group sizes li (w | wr
i,F i (w)) a ﬁrm can realize given its choice of the wage
schedule and the birth-death process characterized above. Hence, in the steady state a
ﬁrm might choose to adjust its wage policy according to the realizations of the diﬀerent
skill group sizes li (w | wr
i,F i (w)). Since this problem is intractable, we assume that a ﬁrm
can specify its wage policy w only once. This implies that we can write the maximization
problem of a type j ﬁrm as
πj =m a x
w
£




7Denote by Wj the set of wage oﬀers that maximize equation (6), i.e. Wj =a r gm a x
w πj,
and the corresponding I-dimensional wage oﬀer distribution for each ﬁrm type j by
Fj (w)=( F1j(w),F 2j(w),...,F Ij(w)),w h e r eFij(w) denotes the wage oﬀer distribution
of type j ﬁrms for skill group i.
Deﬁnition 2: A steady state wage posting equilibrium is a wage oﬀer distribution Fj (w)
with w ∈ Wj for each ﬁrm type j ∈ J such that
πj = Yj (E [l(w)]) − w
TE [l(w)] for all w on the support of Fj (w),( 7 )
πj ≥ Yj (E [l(w)]) − w
TE [l(w)] otherwise,
given the reservation wage wr
i for each skill group i =1 ,2,...,I and a corresponding skill
group wage oﬀer distribution Fi (w) such that the reservation wage wr
i satisﬁes equation
(2) given Fi (w).
2.5 Properties of the Wage Oﬀer Distribution
Following Mortensen (1990) we next describe the properties of the aggregate and the skill
speciﬁcw a g eo ﬀer distributions.
Given the supermodularity property of the production function and the fact that the
expected skill group size given in equation (5) is increasing in w and upper semi-continuous
implies that proﬁts πj are supermodular in wi.T h u s ,aﬁrm paying higher wages for one
skill group also pays higher wages for another skill group.
Proposition 1 Take a ﬁrm of type j ∈ [1,J] oﬀering w ∈ Wj and another ﬁrm of type
j oﬀering w0 ∈ Wj,w h e r ew and w0 ≥ wr, then either w ≥ w0 or w ≤ w0.


























because the same inequality holds for output Yj (E [l(wi,w−i)]) and the wage cost cancel
out.
Now, we prove w ≥ w0 by contradiction. For any w and w0∈ Wj with wi >w 0
i, suppose
w−i < w0
−i. The following chain of inequalities results in the desired contradiction.

























8The ﬁrst and the last inequality result from optimality of w and w0, the second inequality
comes from the supermodularity shown above.
This positive correlation between the wages of workers in diﬀerent skill groups within
ﬁrms is a well established fact. Katz and Summers (1989) show evidence that secretaries
earn more in ﬁrms where average wages are higher. More recently, Barth and Dale-Olsen
(2003) ﬁnd that ”[h]igh-wage establishments for workers with higher education are high-
wage establishments for workers with lower education as well”. The explanation provided
for this empirical observation in this paper rests on two pillars. Firstly, labor market
f r i c t i o n sl e a dt oa nu p w a r ds l o p i n gl a b o rs u p p l yc u r v ef o re a c hs k i l lg r o u pw h i c hc a nb e
seen from equation (5). Secondly, we need the complementarity of the skill groups in the
production process. This guarantees that increasing both labor inputs simultaneously is
optimal. The empirical regularity mentioned above justiﬁes our choice of the production
function, where labor inputs are complements.
Note, that Proposition 1 does not guarantee that a ﬁrm occupies the same position in
the wage oﬀer distribution of all skill groups, because it is possible that there is a mass
point in the wage oﬀer distribution of skill group i but not in the wage oﬀer distribution
in the other −i skill groups.
Given that the skill group size is increasing in the wage wi, it would be a waist of
m o n e y ,i ft h es u p p o r to ft h ew a g eo ﬀer distributions was not a compact set.
Proposition 2 The support of each skill speciﬁcw a g eo ﬀer distribution Fi (w) is con-
n e c t e da n dc l o s e df r o mb e l o w ,i . e .s u p p (Fi)=[ wr
i,wi].
Proof. Suppose not, i.e. no ﬁrms oﬀer a wage wi ∈ (w∗
i,w ∗∗
i ) ⊂ [wr
i,wi].T h i s
cannot be proﬁt maximizing, since the ﬁrm oﬀering w∗∗
i can oﬀer limε→0 (w∗
i + ε),h a v e
the same skill group size, i.e. li (w∗∗
i | wr
i,F i (w∗∗
i )) = limε→0 li ((w∗
i + ε) | wr
i,F i (w∗
i + ε)),
since limε→0 Fi (w∗
i + ε)=Fi (w∗∗
i ),a n dc a nt h u sm a k eh i g h e rp r o ﬁt. Thus, the support
o ft h ew a g eo ﬀer distribution is connected. By the same argument wr
i is part of the
support. The equal proﬁt condition (7) together with the equation for the skill group size
(5) implies that the support is also closed at the upper end.
Firms with diﬀerent technologies j make potentially diﬀerent proﬁts πj in equilibrium,
compare equation (7). We index the technologies according to their proﬁtability, i.e.
πj ≥ πj−1∀j =1 ,2,...,J. The next proposition shows that for any skill group i more
proﬁtable ﬁrms pay higher wages.









the I-dimensional wage oﬀer distributions of j and j − 1-type ﬁrms respectively. Then,
for any wage schedule wj ∈ [wr,w] and wj−1 ∈ [wr,w] it is true that wj ≥ wj−1.
Proof. From the steady state equilibrium condition (7) it follows that:
πj = Yj (E [l(wj)]) − w
T
j E [l(wj)] ∀wj ∈ supp(Fj)
πj ≥ Yj (E [l(wj−1)]) − w
T
j−1E [l(wj−1)] ∀wj−1 / ∈ supp(Fj)
Using the result above we can write
πj = Yj(E [l(wj)]) − w
T
j E [l(wj)] ≥ Yj(E [l(wj−1)]) − w
T
j−1E [l(wj−1)]
≥ Yj−1(E [l(wj−1)]) − w
T
j−1E [l(wj−1)] = πj−1 ≥ Yj−1(E [l(wj)]) − w
T
j E [l(wj)],
where the second inequality results from the fact that πj ≥ πj−1.
The diﬀerence of the ﬁrst and the last terms in this inequality is greater than or equal to
the diﬀerence of its middle terms, i.e Yj(E [l(wj)])−Yj−1(E [l(wj)]) ≥ Yj(E [l(wj−1)])−
Yj−1(E [l(wj−1)]).S i n c el(w) is an increasing function of wages w, the claim follows.
In order to be able to identify a particular technology in the empirical estimation, we
assume that technologies strictly dominate each other by proﬁts, i.e. πj >π j−1.S i n c e
Proposition 2 holds true for any wage pair wj,wj−1 and thus also for wj =i n fwj and
wj−1 =s u p wj−1, it follows that wj ≥ wj−1. T h u s ,t h em o r ep r o d u c t i v eﬁrms with
technology j pay higher wages for all skill groups.
Furthermore, let γj denote the cumulative measure of technology j with γj >γ j−1 > 0
∀j =1 ,2,...,J and γJ =1 . Thus, Proposition 3 implies that the fraction of ﬁrms with
technologies earning proﬁt πj or less post wages wj or below. Thus, for every skill group
i t h ew a g eo ﬀer distribution at wijis given by γj, i.e.
Fi (wij)=γj (8)
The next proposition shows under which condition it is not optimal for a type j ﬁrm
to oﬀer the same wage wi as a mass of other type j ﬁrms does.
Proposition 4 The wage oﬀer distributions Fi (wi) of type j ﬁrms for skill group i is
continuous, if
Yj [E [li (wi | w
r


















E [li (wi | w
r




















= γj − υi (wij).
If the marginal product at the upper bound of the support of Fi (wi) exceeds wij, then mass








¢¤ > wij. (10)




. Equation (6), and the fact
that the cdf Fi(wi) is right continuous implies
lim
ε→0πj (wi + ε,w−i)+w
T
−iE [l(w−i)]
= Yj [E [li (wi | w
r
i,F i (wi))],E[l(w−i)]] − wiE [li (wi | w
r
































since Fi(wi) − Fi(w
−
i )=υi(wi) > 0. If the above inequality holds, when a mass point
exists at wi.
To show that mass points can only exist at the upper bound of the support of Fi (wi)
note that equation (5) together with Proposition 2 implies that E [li (wi | wr
i,F i (wi))] is




,i . e .∆E [li (wi | wr
i,F i (wi))]/∆wi > 0.














































. This expression is only positive if and
only if inequality (11) holds, i.e. only if no mass point exists. Thus, a mass point







= γj − υi (wij).






= γj − υi (wij) gives




















11A necessary condition for no mass point to exist obtains by letting υi (wij) → 0, i.e.
lim
υi(wij)→0




























The basic argument as to why the wage oﬀer distributions can be continuous is given by
Burdett and Mortensen (1998). If all ﬁrms oﬀe rt h es a m ew a g ef o ro n es k i l lg r o u p ,t h e n
individual ﬁrms could attract a signiﬁcantly larger expected skill group size by oﬀering a
slightly higher wage. This wage increase can be arbitrarily small, whereas the resulting
increase in the skill group size is signiﬁcant, since all workers currently working for the
“mass-point” wage will change to the new employer as soon as they get this higher wage
oﬀer. The deviation from a mass point is, thus, proﬁtable if the increase in total output
is higher than the increase in total wage cost induced by a slight wage increase. This is
stated by the condition (9) in Proposition 4.
In order to be able to derive an explicit solution for the wage oﬀer distribution, we
continue under assumption that no mass points exist. If all wage oﬀer distributions
are continuous, then an immediate result of Proposition 1 is that a ﬁrm occupies the
same position in the wage oﬀer distribution of every skill group. To formalize this let us
introduce an index k, which orders the ﬁrms of type j as they increase their wage oﬀer for





lj (w) for all i,l =1 ,2,...,I.( 1 2 )
In order to be able to us the above property we introduce the following separation of a
skill group size, where we rewrite the skill group size as
E [li (w | w
r









δ + λeFj (w)
¤£
δ + λeFj (w−)
¤, rij =






The fact that hj (w) depends only on the position the ﬁrm takes in the wage oﬀer distri-
bution, i.e. Fj (w),i m p l i e st h a thj (w) does not depend on any skill speciﬁc parameter.
Since we want to derive an explicit functional form for the wage oﬀer distribution for each
12skill group i we additionally have to approximate the production technology j by using a
second order Taylor Expansion around the minimum wage wij that ﬁrms with technology
j post. Given a technology Yj (rj) is homogeneous of degree ξj the Taylor Expansion is
given by




























Using the results of Propositions 1-3 we invoke the equal proﬁt condition πj = πr
j and
apply the Taylor Expansion and the ﬁrst order condition to derive the skill-speciﬁcw a g e
oﬀer distribution. Proposition 5 provides the solution for Fi(wi) as a function of wi.
Proposition 5 Given that production functions Yj (E [l(w)]) ∀j =1 ,2,...,J are super-
modular and given that no mass point exists, then a unique equilibrium wage oﬀer distri-
bution Fij(wi) for each skill group i =1 ,2,...,I exists that has the following form









j (rj) − wi
Y 0
j (rj) − wij
, (13)


































− wi > 0. (15)
13Proof. See Appendix.

















As p e c i a lc a s ef o rFij(wi) when
¡
Y 0
j (rj) − wij
¢
rij = µij is shown in the proof of Propo-
s i t i o n5 .S i n c ei ti m p l i e sa r t i ﬁcial restrictions on ξj considering this case here is neither
interesting nor useful.
For a production function with homogeneity of degree one the explicit wage oﬀer
distribution resembles the distribution derived in Burdett and Mortensen (1998) and has
its typical increasing density. Since an upward-sloping earnings density is at odds with
the empirical observation of a ﬂat right tail, Mortensen (1990) introduces diﬀerences in
ﬁrm productivity by allowing for diﬀerent productivity levels in order to improve the ﬁt
to the empirical wage earnings distribution. Bowlus et al. (1995) demonstrate that this
greatly improves the ﬁt to the empirical earnings distribution. Bontemps et al. (2000) and
Burdett and Mortensen (1998) formulate a closed-form solution for a continuous atomless
productivity distribution, which translates into a right-tailed wage earnings distribution,
depending on the assumed productivity dispersion.4
T h en o v e l t yi st h a tt h ew a g eo ﬀer distribution given in Proposition 5 can have an
increasing and a decreasing density for a given production technology. Although we allow
for the possibility that heterogeneous production technologies are used, we do not need
any technology dispersion to get a hump-shaped density. As stated in condition (15) only
technologies with homogeneity of degree 2 >ξ j can have an increasing density. Notice
further that as the wage w increases condition (15) is more likely to be violated implying
that the wage oﬀer density can have an upward sloping part for small wages and an
downward sloping part for large wages. A production technology with decreasing returns
to scale would result in a negative wage oﬀer density for at least one skill group, hence
violate the ﬁrst order condition and result in a violation of the continuity condition.
T h er e a s o nf o rw h yi n c r e a s i n gr e t u r n st os c a l ec a nb e n dt h ew a g eo ﬀer density in such
a way that is depicts a long right tail has its cause in the equal proﬁt condition. Let us
focus on the case with a homogenous production function with increasing returns to scale
4However, tail behavior of the productivity density, hence oﬀer and earnings densities, in this case is
subject to additional restrictions (see Bontemps et al., 2000; Proposition 8).
14and compare it to an economy with constant returns to scale, where the marginal product
of ﬁrms oﬀering the reservation wage schedule are equivalent in both environments. First
note that the skill group size is determined solely by the ﬁrm’s position in the wage oﬀer
distribution. Thus, the shape of the wage oﬀer distribution does not matter for the output
generated. Due to increasing returns to scale the output of ﬁrms at the top of the wage
oﬀer distribution increases more than compared to an economy with constant returns to
scale. In order for ﬁr m so nt h et o po ft h ew a g eo ﬀer distribution to make the same proﬁts
as ﬁrms at the lower end, the ﬁrms in an environment with increasing returns to scale have
to pay higher wage in order to satisfy the equal proﬁt condition as compared to ﬁrms in an
environment with constant returns to scale who are at the same position of the wage oﬀer
distribution (except of course the ﬁrm oﬀering the reservation wage schedule). Thus, the
wage oﬀer distribution in an economy with increasing returns to scale is more dispersed.
If the returns to scale are large enough, the wage diﬀerence paid by “neighboring” ﬁrms
at the upper end of the wage oﬀer distribution increases generating a decreasing wage
oﬀer density.
Mortensen (2000) makes implicitly a similar restriction to production functions with
increasing returns to scale when deriving endogenously the employer heterogeneity based
on match speciﬁc capital. He assumes that the production technology has constant returns
with respect to labor but on increasing economies of scale due to the capital k employed
by the ﬁrm, i.e. Y (l(w)) = kαl(w). By simulation he shows that for positive α the wage
oﬀer distribution has a ﬂat right tail.
Decreasing tail of the oﬀer density implies the same for the earnings density. Consider
the the latter in more detail. From (15) follows that ξj > 2 is a suﬃcient condition for
fij(wi) to have a decreasing right tail. The tail of the density function deﬁned on [wi1,wiJ]
converges at the highest possible rate. However letting {wiJ,wiJ} go to inﬁnity we get
the following result.
Proposition 6 Let wiJ →∞and wiJ →∞.U n d e r t h e s u ﬃcient condition for a
decreasing right tail of fiJ(wi) the right tail of the equilibrium earnings density giJ(wi)
converges at the rate faster then w−2. Speed of convergence is a power law that positively
depends on the degree of homogeneity of the production function.
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,w h e r eδ>0.
The result of Proposition 6 tells us that the equilibrium earnings density of Proposition
5 encompasses the family of Pareto and Singh-Maddala densities, right tail of which is
acknowledged to have the best ﬁt to the observed high-earnings data (see Singh and
Maddala, 1976). Similarly to the equilibrium densities of Bontemps et al. (2000), tail
behaviour of giJ(wi) excludes the distributions with the exponential speed of convergence
(e.g. lognormal) form the set of possible functional form candidates for the equilibrium
earnings distribution. Furthermore, increasing returns of thep r o d u c t i o nf u n c t i o ne x t e n d
the result of Proposition 8 in Bontemps et al. (2000) allowing earnings density to converge
both slower and faster then w−3.
Finally, the comparative statics results of the original Burdett-Mortensen model are
still valid for the general wage oﬀer distribution function. If the arrival rate of on-the-
job oﬀers, i.e. λe, goes to zero, then the wage oﬀer distribution Fi(w) collapses to a
mass point at the reservation wage wr
i, which equals the Diamond (1971) monopsony
16solution. If moving from one job to another becomes very easy, i.e. λe goes to inﬁnity,
the competition among ﬁrms drives wages up and the wage earnings distribution Gi(w)
converges to a mass point at the marginal product of the skill group.
3. ECONOMETRIC MODEL
Here we consider in detail the structural econometric model based on the theory presented
above. We assume a Cobb-Douglas production technology which allows for constant and








i αij = ξj ≥ 1, αij > 0.
In general, we build upon the model developed by Bowlus et al. (1995), (2001).
In the discussion to follow we put special emphasis on such new features as parameter
identiﬁcation and related modiﬁcation of the estimation procedure.
3.1 The Likelihood Function
Let us start from the formulation of the likelihood function. For Poisson process with
rate θ the joint distribution of the elapsed (te) and residual (tr) duration of time spent
by an individual in a certain state of the labour market is f(te,t r)=θ
2e−θ(te+tr).F o ra n
individual that belongs to i-th skill group the appropriate Poisson rates are λi if the person
is unemployed and δ + λe [1 − Fi(w)] if the person is employed at wage w. Furthermore:
• For Unemployed: Equilibrium probability of sampling an unemployed agent who
belongs to i-th skill group is m−1qiδ/(δ + λi). In case the subsequent job transition
is observed we know the oﬀered wage and can record the value of the wage oﬀer
density fi(w).
• For Employed: Equilibrium probability of sampling an agent who belongs to i-th
skill group and earns wage w is m−1qigi(w)λi/(δ + λi). In case the transition to
the next state is observed we record the destination state. The probabilities of
exit to unemployment and to next job are ρj→u = δ/
¡





δ + λeFi (w)
¢
respectively.
17For convenience of estimation, deﬁne κi = λi/δ , κe = λe/δ . Then the likelihood


























.( 1 8 )
In (17) and (18) dl =1 , if a spell is left-censored, 0 otherwise; dr =1 , if a spell is right-
censored, 0 otherwise; dt =1if there is a job-to-job transition, 0 otherwise. Substitution
of the appropriate gi (w), fi(w) and Fi(w) into (17) and (18) completes the formulation
of the likelihood function, where gi(w) is obtained from Fi(w) using (4).
Notice that except of probability terms m−1qi/(1+κi) and m−1qiκi/(1+κi) (17) and
(18) are the same as in Kiefer and Neumann (1993) or Bowlus et al. (1995). The main
diﬀerences are rather driven by the functional forms of the oﬀer and earnings distributions.
3.2 Homogeneous Firms
It is instructive to start with the model with no productivity dispersion, since the theory
allows obtaining an earnings density with a decreasing right tail even with homogeneous
employers. This density will have I − 1 jumps at inﬁmum wages and I − 1 spike at
supremum wages of each skill group.
Under employer homogeneity the assumed production function modiﬁes to Y (l(w)) =
p
QI





mFi(w),w h e r eFi(w) i sg i v e ni nP r o p o s i t i o n5w i t hJ =1 . Rewritten in





























































.( 2 0 )
where η =( 1+κe)
−2.
Consider the unknowns of the econometric model. The skill measures {qi}
I
i=1 are
known from the data and they are nothing else but sample sizes of each skill group.
Furthermore, to avoid bounds of the likelihood function depending on the parameters,
Kiefer and Neumann (1993) suggest extreme order statistics {min(wi),max(wi)} as the
consistent estimates for wi and wi respectively. Finally, from the fact that (20) holds for
any i one can represent any αi as a function of ξ and the rest of structural parameters.





ξ (ξ − 1)(1 + η)rl









Without loss of generality setting i =1 , l =2 ,...,I and recognizing that α1 = ξ−
PI
k=2 αk,
we get a system of I−1 linear equations that is easily veriﬁed to provide a unique solution







To demonstrate that the model with the parameter space that eventually reduces





are uniquely identiﬁed from the duration data irrespective of the func-
tional form of the oﬀer distribution (e.g. Koning et al., 1995). From this follows that
production size ξ is uniquely identiﬁed from the labour costs data.
3.3 Heterogeneous Firms
For heterogeneous employers the production functions are given in (16). The relevant
occupation-speciﬁcw a g eo ﬀer distribution Fi(w) is provided in Proposition 5. Rewritten
5To see this it is suﬃcient to rewrite the system in the matrix form. The matrix to be inverted will
have a particular structure that never allows one row to be a linear combination of the others since
wl−ηwl
wi−ηwi > 0 ∀i,l.

















































for all wi ∈ [wij,wij], i =1 ,...,I and j =1 ,...,J. Additionally we assume that for any i
and j none of αij is equal to each other.



































Consider the unknowns of the econometric model with heterogeneous ﬁrms. As before,
skill group size and group-speciﬁcb o u n d sf o rt h eo ﬀer distributions are available from
the data. At the same time there appears an additional set of unknown cutoﬀ wages
{wij}
I,J−1
i,j=1 for the ﬁrm-speciﬁcw a g eo ﬀer. Unlike in the homogeneous model, existence
of the unknown cutoﬀ wages does not allow using (22) to write down αij as a function of
exclusively ξj and frictional parameters. However, knowing that wij = wij−1 provides us
with additional cross-restrictions on pj−1 and pj. Using these cross-restrictions together









i,j=1 are expressed as a function of production parameters {αij}
I−1,J
i,j=1 ,
search frictions and ξ,
202. production parameters {αij}
I−1,J
i,j=1 are expressed as a function of cutoﬀwages {wij}
I,J−1
i,j=1 ,
search frictions and ξ.
First of all, irrespective of the choice of the parameter subset to be substituted out,
(22) implies that there exist J(I − 1) independent equations that completely determine
cutoﬀ wages and production parameters.6 Moreover, for I skill groups there exist (J−1)I
unknown production parameters and J(I − 1) unknown cutoﬀ wages. Since both above
representations must be equivalent to each other we conclude that the parameters cannot
be identiﬁed whenever J(I − 1) 6=( J − 1)I. From this follows that I = J symmetry is a
necessary condition for identiﬁcation of the model with employer heterogeneity.
N e x t ,w en o t i c et h a td e s p i t eb o t hs p e c i ﬁcations are equally possible, expressing cutoﬀ
wages as a function of the rest of the parameters, is the strictly dominated one. The reason
is that cutoﬀ wages are the discontinuity points of the likelihood function, so substituting
them with known functions of the rest of the parameters means that no gradient-based
methods can be used when estimating the model. Even though derivative-free methods
are available a serious problem may appear when the assumption of no mass points in
the oﬀer distribution becomes violated at the solution. This case will imply constrained
derivative-free optimization subject to the no mass point condition (for detailed discussion
see Proposition 4 and p.22 later on), which is already a very diﬃcult task.
Choosing the second way to represent the model one can show that (22) implies that




























which gives rise to a system of J(I − 1) linear equations with J(I − 1) unknown cutoﬀ
wages. It is also easy to see that for J =1the above identity reduces to the one described
in the previous subsection. Rewriting the implied system in a matrix form one can ﬁnd
that the matrix to be inverted is block-diagonal. Each and every block in it has the
same structure as the matrix of a corresponding problem in Section 3.2, out of which
invertability follows.
Unique solution for {αij}
I−1,J
i,j=1 reduces the parameter space to the subset of the lo-
cation parameters of the discontinuity points of the likelihood function {wij}
I,J−1
i,j=1 and















i,j=1 appear outside the system of these equations.
21(2004) demonstrate that in the considered class of models shape and location parameters
are independent of each other. Thus conditional identiﬁability will imply joint identiﬁa-
bility of the both. Within the subset of shape parameters search frictions are uniquely
identiﬁed using the duration data. From this follows that production sizes are uniquely
identiﬁed from the labour costs data.
The above representation of the model ﬁts into a convenient stepwise estimation strat-
egy developed by Bowlus et al. (1995). At the ﬁrst step, given the starting values for the
structural parameters, cutoﬀ wages are estimated by simulated annealing. At the second
step, given the estimates of the cutoﬀ wages, the likelihood function is maximized with
respect to θ. The second step is a “smooth” optimization and can be eﬃciently executed
using the gradient-based methods. Given the estimates from both steps into (4) and (8)






1 − ˆ Gi(wij)
1+κe ˆ Gi(wij)
,( 2 3 )
where ˆ Gi is a nonparametric estimate of the skill-speciﬁc earnings distribution, and the
cycle repeats.
Provided that the maximum likelihood estimates satisfy the condition stated in Propo-
sition 4 we can apply the result of Chernozhukov and Hong (2004) who show that the











0).( 2 4 )
Furthermore Chernozhukov and Hong (2004) validate bootstrap methods for the estima-
tion of the asymptotic covariance matrix above.
3.4 Speciﬁcation Check
We have derived the wage oﬀer distribution (14) under the assumption that all skill
speciﬁcw a g eo ﬀer distributions Fi (wi) are continuous. As argued in Proposition 4 a mass
point can only exist, if increasing the wage further would imply that the additional wage
cost outweighs the additional output produced with the additionally recruited workers.
Consider an arbitrary skill group h. Proposition 4 implies that the distribution function






> whj.( 2 5 )
22The estimated parameters are consistent only when the model is properly speciﬁed, i.e.
when (25) holds.
It is also easy to see that in a special case with no skill diﬀerentiation, constant returns
and unique productivity type ﬁrms, which is the original Burdett-Mortensen model, (25)
gives us 1 > w/p, which is always true, implying continuous oﬀer distribution in the basic
BM model.
Furthermore the estimated parameters must be consistent with the assumption that
proﬁts of the ﬁrms with diﬀerent technologies are ranked, i.e.
0 ≤ πj−1 <π j.( 2 6 )
In terms of the Burdett-Mortensen model with discrete employer heterogeneity the above
condition will imply the ranking of productivity levels. Possibility of violation of produc-
tivity ranking in applied work is discussed by Bowlus et al. (1995), p.S127.
One should also keep in mind that whenever any of the above restrictions is binding
at the maximum the asymptotic covariance matrix of the ML estimator is no longer
given by (24) and the exact form of it is unknown. Moreover even in the simpler models
with inequality constraints it is shown that bootstrap fails to consistently estimate the
covariance matrix when the true parameter is on the boundary of the parameter space
(see Andrews, 2000, for discussion).
Finally we notice that in the extended model with distinct productivity types another







and (4) imply that ˆ Gi = ˆ Gl ∀i,l ∈ [2,I]. At the same time (23) does not restrict ˆ Gi
to be equal to each other. Thus, if {θ,γj} ∀j ∈ [2,J− 1] is a consistent estimate of the
true parameters the values of the empirical earnings distribution at the skill-speciﬁcc u t o ﬀ
wages must not be signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from each other.
4. EMPIRICAL APPLICATION
4.1 The Data
We use data from the German Socio-Economic Panel — a longitudinal survey of German
households, which was started at 1984 and conducted on the annual basis ever since. Our
sample contains information from the waves of 1984 to 2001. The analysis is restricted to
23working age population of native West Germans and major groups of foreigners living in
West Germany.
According to the theoretical model we have only two states, namely “full time em-
ployment” and “unemployment”. Since utility maximizing behavior of the representatives
of the other groups, such as part-time employed, self-employed or non-participants can
be diﬀerent from behavior of the individuals considered by the model we exclude all the
agents who are neither full time employed nor unemployed from the sample (see Koning
et al., 1995, van den Berg and Ridder, 1998).
To estimate the model we need have information on both duration and wages. We
get duration information by choosing a reference year and sampling all employed and
unemployed individuals at this year. After doing so for each observation we track the
individual history backwards and forwards to restore the elapsed and residual duration of
his/her staying in the current state of the market. Both elapsed and residual spells can be
incomplete due to overshooting the starting and terminal dates of the observation period
while the spell is still in progress. To minimize the number of incomplete spells and at the
same time provide the most recent information about the length of total unemployment or
job duration we choose 1995 as a reference year. Whenever residual spell is complete we
also record information about the exit state (one should keep in mind that in the setting
of the model, job-to-job changes are also considered as “change of state”).
Unemployment duration is calculated from the retrospective labour force status cal-
endarium of the GSOEP, in which respondents have to provide their labour force status
for every month of the previous calendar year.
Retrieving job duration requires a bit more elaboration. First of all every currently
employed individual provides information about the calendar month and year of the job
start. Though for those who have undergone a job change we need to check additionally
the date and the type of this job change. Apart from job changes to a new employers
or within ﬁrm job changes with wage promotion, which classiﬁes as change of state, this
can also be company takeover, return to work etc. Thus only simultaneous application of
both sources of information allows us to ﬁnd the correct starting date. Similarly we ﬁnd
the endpoint of the job spell. The calendar end of job spells is set to the ﬁrst reported job
end in subsequent waves or to the ﬁrst reported job start with new employer or within
the same ﬁrm.
We also need to comment on incomplete spells. Those incomplete from the left can be
seldom observed in the data. In our data set, the main reason for a spell being incomplete
24from the left is that it is not always possible to determine its exact calendar month
(sometimes even year), because the respondent was simply not interviewed prior to the
start of the spell. There are much more spells incomplete from the right. This happens
because of the two reasons. First of all, the spell can still be in progress by the end of the
available observation period. Secondly, spells that terminate by exit to non-participation
are treated as right-censored.
The ﬁnal bit of information necessary for the estimation of the model is earnings.
Here we diﬀerentiate between net wage received by the worker and labour costs to the
ﬁrm. In the theoretical model we have two sets of parameters, namely workers’ search
intensities and production parameters. Since the theory states that reservation wage and
labour size depend on just the position of the ﬁr mi nt h ew a g eo ﬀer distribution, frictional
parameters can be estimated using any of the two types of earnings data, provided that
the ordering of the ﬁrms does not change when we pass from net wages to labour costs.
For identiﬁcation of the production parameters, to the contrary, labour costs are crucial
because they enter the employers’ proﬁt maximization problem explicitly.
GSOEP provides the data on both net and gross wages. Individuals who are employed
at their interview provide the earnings information of one month prior to the interview.
For the sample of job spells we use wage information provided by respondents at the
y e a rf o rw h i c ht h es a m p l ei sd r a w n .F o rt h es a m p l eo fu n e m p l o y m e n ts p e l l sw eu s et h e
ﬁrst reported wage after the end of unemployment, given that the transition to the job
is observed. All wages are deﬂated by the West German consumer price index at prices
of 1998. Labour costs are deﬁned as a sum of gross wage and ﬁrms’ contributions to the
employees’ social security payments. Information on the latter is available form the Social
Security Oﬃce.
In our application we estimate the model with three diﬀerent productivity levels and
three diﬀerent skill groups. Skill stratiﬁcation of the sample is performed on the basis
of the International Standard Classiﬁcation of Education (ISCED). We identify as “low-
skilled” all individuals who have inadequate or general elementary training. To “medium-
skilled” group belong those who have got middle vocational training. Finally, as “high-
skilled” we qualify all the rest, i.e. those with higher vocational training, university
education etc.
Summary of duration and wage data is presented in Table 1 and Table 2 respectively.
Along with the information about the full sample we present summary statistics for the
three skill groups. The data on skills reﬂect such basic facts about less skilled in compar-
25Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Event History Data ∗
Skills
Full
Low Medium High Sample
Number of individuals: 898 1931 1062 3891
Employed: 746 1786 1025 3557
Unemployed: 152 145 37 334
Employed Agents:
Uncensored observations with:
job → job transition: 49 187 178 414
job → unemployment transition: 98 126 41 256
mean time spell between two states [job duration]: 129.639 109.815 89.566 107.576
(std. deviation): (114.92) (102.14) (85.42) (101.01)
Censored observations
a) left-censored durations only
with job → job transition: 3 12 6 21
with job → unemployment transition: 1 13 1 15
b) right-censored durations only: 575 1407 781 2763
c) both left- and right-censored durations: 20 41 18 79
Mean time spell [both uncensored and censored]: 163.637 153.259 154.096 155.677
(std. deviation): (116.23) (118.84) (120.30) (118.76)
Unemployed Agents:
Uncensored observations (u → j transition): 37 49 13 99
mean time spell between two states [job duration]: 19.595 22.429 10.538 19.808
(std. deviation): (14.35) (26.72) (12.22) (21.41)
Censored observations
a) left-censored durations (u → j transition) only: 1 2 - 3
b) right-censored durations only: 106 89 24 219
c) both left- and right-censored durations: 8 5 - 13
Mean time spell [both uncensored and censored]: 40.974 32.310 24.270 35.362
(std. deviation): (36.37) (31.90) (23.07) (33.61)
∗ Duration data in Months
26Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Earnings Data
Skills
Full
Low Medium High Sample
Labour Costs:
Sample Minimum: 734. 1038. 1646. 734.
Mean Cost: 4431 (1417) 5245 (1903) 6950 (2642) 5554 (2258)
Sample Maximum: 12057. 17348. 20523. 20523.
Net Wages:
Sample Minimum: 604. 635. 952. 604.
Mean Wage: 2472 (809) 2880 (1083) 3967 (1667) 3101 (1356)
Sample Maximum: 6878. 9524. 11534. 11534.
ison to higher skilled as higher level of unemployment, higher rate of job loss and longer
unemployment duration. Additionally net wages and labour costs are summarized by
kernel density plots (see Figures A.1-2 in the Appendix). As expected, density of both
n e te a r n i n g sa n dl a b o u rc o s t so ft h el o w - s k i l l e da r em o r ep e a k e da ti t s ’l e f t m o s tp a r to f
the support than those of the higher skills. Also mean net wage of high-skilled workers
amounts to DM 3967 which exceeds that of medium-skilled by 27% and of low-skilled by
more then 37%. Labour costs are roughly the same across the skills and almost double
the net wage.
4.2 Estimation Results: Fit of the Model
First we estimate the model with identical employers setting oﬀ with the constant returns
assumption (see Table A.1 in the Appendix). When doing so we also ﬁt the original
Burdett-Mortensen model with no productivity dispersion to compare it with the results
provided by our extension.7 It turns out that the structural parameters estimated with
both original and extended constant-returns speciﬁcations do not signiﬁcantly diﬀer from
each other, which implies that from the empirical perspective sole introduction of skill
7For the sake of brevity we do not report the estimates from the original model here.
27diﬀerences does not improve the estimates of search frictions. Predicted theoretical oﬀer
and labour costs densities (Figures A.3-4 respectively) for the extended theoretical model
with constant returns have two jumps at the reservation wages of the medium- and high-
skilled workers and two spikes at the maximum wages of the low- and medium-skilled
workers. This generates a quasi-“falling” right tail of the aggregate density despite that
skill-speciﬁc ones are strictly increasing. However, even with large I the model with
constant returns has limited potential of ﬁtting the data.
The results change when we switch to the increasing returns technology speciﬁcation
(the second column in Table A.1). First, when inserted into (3), the estimates of κi ﬁtt h e
observed skill-speciﬁc unemployment rates closer. Second, and more important, the model
with increasing returns provides much more realistic estimates for κe and δ. Though the
most interesting result is displayed in Figures A.3-4 where we see that increasing returns
imply oﬀer and labour costs densities with strictly decreasing right tail even in absence
of productivity dispersion. Even though the predicted labour costs density is still too
ﬂat pointing towards existence of heterogeneous production technologies in the data, this
result alone is already remarkable.
The initial unrestricted estimates of the model with increasing returns to scale do not
meet the “no mass point condition” of Proposition 4. Therefore in Table A.1 we report
the estimates which are obtained by maximizing the likelihood function subject to (25).
Furthermore we restrict proﬁts to be non-negative. It turns out that at the constrained
maximum the condition in (25) becomes inactive. However, the non-negativity of proﬁts
is violated on the upper end of the oﬀer distribution and the non-negativity constraint
on proﬁts remains binding at the maximum. As a consequence the asymptotic covariance
matrix of the estimated parameters becomes unknown.8
Next we estimate the model with employer heterogeneity. As before, we also ﬁtt h e
original Burdett-Mortensen model with J =3 .9 Again, the results of the original Burdett-
Mortensen model and our extension with constant returns almost do not diﬀer from each
other. Even though two jumps at the left tail and two spikes at the right one improve the
ﬁt of the aggregate labour costs density (see Figures A.5-6), locally increasing right tail
of individual-speciﬁc densities still keeps the ﬁt from being satisfactory.
Relaxing the assumption of constant returns again changes the picture. Though, sim-
8We report conﬁdence intervals based on (24). However, sinc et h et r u ep a r a m e t e r s lie on the boundary
of the parameter space, (24) underestimates the true covariance matrix (see also Section 3.4).
9For space considerations we again do not report the estimates from the original model.
28ilarly to the case with identical ﬁrms, the unrestricted MLEs still violate proﬁtr a n k i n g
requirement. Therefore we perform the estimation of the model given (25) and (26).
Remarkable enough, in the restricted maximum the “no mass point condition” of Propo-
sition 4 is again inactive which empirically supports the k-percent rule (12). However
π(wij−1) <π (wij) turn out to be binding. On one hand this may be simply a conse-
quence of the insuﬃcient heterogeneity of the production side. On the other, this can also
be interpreted as an empirical indication of the restrictiveness of the equal-proﬁtc o n d i t i o n
among the ﬁrms with the same technology. While the ﬁrst interpretation opens a purely
empirical issue that can be amended by just increasing the number of distinct skill levels,
resolution of the alternative case would require a more reﬁned theoretical model.
The estimates of the model with increasing returns and three-point productivity dis-
persion are presented in the second column of Table A.2. Comparing them with the es-
timates from the speciﬁcation with identical ﬁrms and increasing returns technology two
further improvements can be noticed. First, we manage to obtain a better ﬁtf o rt h ed e -
gree of returns to scale in the whole economy. According to our estimates the homogeneity
degrees are 1.04 for the “low-productive” technology, 1.40 for the “medium-productive”





in the economy these estimates imply the economy-wide returns
to scale at the level of 1.20.T h i sg o e si nl i n ew i t hn u m e r o u se v i d e n c e sf r o mt h el i t e r a t u r e
on the estimation of the returns to scale using diﬀerent types of production functions.
Typical estimates in this literature support the increasing returns hypothesis and range
from about 1.1 to about 1.35 (see Färe at al., 1985, Kim, 1992, and Zellner and Ryu, 1998,
and references therein). Second, and even more important, productivity dispersion along
with increasing returns technologies also leads to a better ﬁtting oﬀer and labour costs
densities. In Figures A.5-6 one can easily see the dominance of increasing over constant
returns speciﬁcation in terms of both shape of the right tail and smoothed out spikes
around the mean.
4.3 Estimation Results: Social Returns to Education
We use our estimation results to investigate whether the education level in the economy
is eﬃcient, i.e. whether the increase in output coming from educating the marginal
individual equals the individual’s and the government’s investment costs.
Following Grout (1984), who discusses the hold-up problem as a potential source of
underinvestment, Acemoglu (1996) and Masters (1998) develop the models where under-
29investment results from the fact that search or matching frictions make it impossible for
workers to capture the whole return on their investment. This is also true in the present
paper, since ﬁrms earn positive proﬁts. However, there can also be overinvestment in the
model, because lower unemployment rate among high skilled workers can increase the
return to human capital investment to such a degree that workers overinvest in skills.10
The lower unemployment rate for high skilled workers if compared to low skilled workers
can be sustained since the higher match value from meeting a high skilled worker en-
courages ﬁrms to create more vacancies for high skilled workers. Thus, whether there are
social returns to education in an economy depends not only on the skill-speciﬁcw a g eo ﬀer
distributions but also on the skill-speciﬁc unemployment rates.
To be able to investigate the question of whether there is over- or underinvestment, we
ﬁrst ask how many individuals a social planner would instruct to become high skilled. Let
us assume that ﬁrms’ proﬁts are distributed arbitrarily among employed and unemployed
workers. Since we assume that workers are risk neutral, the distribution of income does
not matter for the aggregate welfare function. Thus, the social planner maximizes total
output produced by all ﬁrms minus the aggregate cost of education that individuals incur
in order to acquire skills.
Suppose the individual cost ci,a of acquiring skill level i is the product of the individual
ability a distributed according to some continuous distribution function H (a) among
individuals on the support a ∈ [a,a] and a skill speciﬁcc o m p o n e n tci, i.e. ci,a = cia,
where we assume ci >c i−1.




















qi = m, s0 = a, sI = a
qi = m[H (ai) − H (ai−1)] ∀ i ∈ I





¯ ¯ ¯ ¯PI
i=1 qi=m
=( ci − ci−1)a
S
i ∀ i ∈ I,
10This is due to the assumption of segmented labor markets for all skill groups. If we assumed a
constant arrival rate across all unemployed workers, underinvestment into education would be inevitable.
30which implies that social welfare is maximized if the cost the marginal individual incurs,
equals the output-increase generated by all ﬁrms.11
Denote the measure of any adjacent skill groups by n so that n = qi + qi+1.I ti s
easy to show that for a j-type ﬁrm the marginal change in output due to educating a
marginal i-skilled worker one level up (i.e. due to the marginal increase of the measure of
i +1 -skilled workers) is
∂Yj(l(w))
∂qi+1






















2κe (αij + αi+1j)




















¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
n=qi+qi+1
dF.( 2 7 )
The result in (27) considers the output eﬀect from the change of only qi and qi+1, keeping
the rest of the skill composition unaltered. This, however, can be extended by considering
the decision to induce marginal shift towards higher education in both i-th and i+1-skill
groups simultaneously. Denoting the total amount of workforce in the three adjacent
groups by n,s ot h a tn =
P2
k=0 qi+k, and considering the appropriate ﬁrst order derivatives














dF.( 2 8 )
In order to learn whether the social returns from educating an agent to a higher skill level
exceed the private returns of doing so, we proceed in comparing the marginal increase in
output caused by a change in the skill structure with the cost the marginal individual
incurs to acquire this skill level. It has to be true that in equilibrium the marginal worker
is exactly indiﬀerent between the two skill groups, i.e. Ui = Ui−1. Thus, using (1a), the
private cost of educating oneself from the “low” to the “high” level can be written as
(ci − ci−1)a
I












1+κe (1 − Fi−1(w))
dw.
11Aggregate output is obtained by integrating from the ﬁrm oﬀering the reservation wage schedule, i.e.
Fi1 (wr
i)=0 ,t ot h eﬁrm oﬀering the maximum wage to all skill groups, i.e. FiJ (wi)=1 .
31Note, that (29) refers to the optimal decision of the searching individual,w h i c hi m p l i e s
that the net wages wr
i and wi — not the wage costs — are the bounds of the distribution
of the net oﬀer. Using the extreme order statistics as a consistent estimator of wr
i and
noticing that the reservation wage is given by (2) simpliﬁes the calculation of (ci − ci−1)aI
i
in practice. Alternatively, translating the estimated cutoﬀ wages expressed in terms of
labour costs into the cutoﬀ wages expressed in terms of net earnings (which is possible
s i n c ew ek n o w{γj}∀j and nonparametric estimates of both labour costs and net earnings
cdfs) one can evaluate the integrals in (29) directly.
We use the estimates of the structural parameters to evaluate (27)-(29) and see whether
present skill structure is eﬃcient. In doing so we consider three cases:
1. Marginal shift from Medium to High skills (the fraction of low-skilled is constant),
2. Marginal shift from Low to Medium skills (the fraction of high-skilled is constant),
3. Marginal shift away from both Low and Medium skills (only the total workforce size
is constant).
Our key ﬁnding is that indeed a marginal change of the skill structure towards a larger
share of skilled workers uniformly generates an increase in output.
Taking the very ﬁrst case, the marginal increase of the fraction of high-skilled workers
by educating the medium-skilled induces an expected output increase of DM 2269.88.A t
the same time the period private cost of this increase is only DM 225.78. From this follows
that there exists a strong evidence of underinvestment into the higher education and from
the standpoint of social planer it would be optimal to subsidize further education on the
medium-to-high level.
Next consider the expected output eﬀect form educating a low-skilled worker to become
a medium-skilled one. As before this eﬀect is positive, although a bit smaller in absolute
value, and amounts to DM 2057.27. Dealing with the private costs of this shift we get
a somewhat odd result which shows that these costs are negative (DM −586.65). So
the conclusion is that it is strictly dominant for an individual to be a low-skilled worker.
This oddity, though, is most probably a consequence of a measurement error that has
inﬂuenced the extreme order statistics used to calculate the private costs. In other words,
the estimated DM −586.65 p r i v a t ec o s tf o rt h em a r g i n a li n d ividual results from assuming
that the reservation wages are the same for all workers of one skill group, i.e. that the
marginal individual has a the reservation wage DM 604 as low-skilled worker and DM 635
as medium-skilled worker like all other workers.
32Alternatively, we also calculate private costs evaluating the integrals in (29) directly.
This measure give us, however, unrealistically large values. The cost of educating oneself
from medium to high level in this case is DM 6268.11 and from low to medium is DM
3839.87. Such big values are clearly a consequence of the assumption of a common reser-
vation wage for all workers of one skill group. And in fact, when we predict the reservation
wage computing (2), we get DM 1213 instead of sample minimum value of DM 604 for the
low-skilled and DM 4571 instead of sample minimum value of DM 635 for the medium-
skilled. For the high-skilled the predicted wr is close to the upper bound of the support of
GH(w). While it is reasonable to assume that measurement error may alter the extreme
order statistics within the range of bottom 10% of a skill-speciﬁc earnings distribution,
all the predicted reservation wages lie above it. So using the results based on the direct
evaluation of the integrals in (29) we are quite likely to make even bigger mistake than
the one induced by the measurement error in the sample minimum estimates.
Finally consider the third case in which marginal shift towards both medium and high
skills is possible. The expected output eﬀect of such a shift of the skill structure is given
in (28) and amounts to DM 4327.15,w h i c hi st h es a m ea st h es u mo ft h ee ﬀects of the
separate shifts discussed above. As to the total private costs of this type of change of
the skill structure, these will be the sum of (cH,a − cM,a) and (cM,a − cL,a).A g a i n , t h e
measurement error will prevent us from making the correct inference.
To conclude, the present paper oﬀers a new approach to measuring social returns to
education within an equilibrium framework which takes the skill speciﬁc unemployment
risk explicitly into account. The drawback is, however, that due to the measurement
error in the workers’ reservation wages we are not able to say whether there is over- or
underinvestment in an economy.
Abstracting from the application to social returns, our results also appear to be in line
with those of Falk and Koebel (1999) who show that output is a positive and increasing
function of skills and that output eﬀect dominates in explaining the shift away from
unskilled labour in Germany.
5. CONCLUSION
This paper extends the search equilibrium model of Burdett and Mortensen (1998) by
introducing diﬀerent skill groups and linking them via a production function which permits
constant and increasing returns to scale.
33The main theoretical contribution of this paper is that allowing production function
to have any degree of homogeneity returns to scale we are able to generate a decreasing
wage oﬀer density. Subsequent introduction of employer heterogeneity leads to further
improvement of the shape of wage oﬀer and earnings distributions predicted by the model.
Another important result of the extended model is that local monopsony power of ﬁrms
and complementarity of skills in the production function imply that ﬁrms occupy the
same position in the wage oﬀer distribution for each skill group. This fact makes our
theory consistent with the empirical ﬁndings that wages of workers of diﬀerent skill groups
employed at the same ﬁrm are positively correlated.
Theoretical solution of our extension suggests a structural econometric model that
allows estimating not only search frictions inherent to the labour market but also the
parameters of the production function. Richness of the theoretical model enables us to
estimate all parameters of interest using wage and duration data only, which requires no
additional information on the output.
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37APPENDIX
Figure A.1: “Kernel Estimates of Earnings Densities”












Figure A.2: “Kernel Estimates of Labour Cost Densities”

















38Table A.1: “Estimation Results: Homogeneous Firms”
Speciﬁcation
Constant Returns ∗ Increasing Returns
κu1 4.6182 [4.1640, 5.0725] 5.9115 [5.2372, 6.5858]
κu2 8.2312 [7.6093, 8.8531] 10.4875 [9.5566, 11.4183]
κu3 14.1192 [12.5421, 15.6963] 17.8712 [15.4814, 20.2611]
κe 0.1605 [0.1421, 0.1789] 2.0963 [1.7342, 2.4585]
δ 0.0066 [0.063, 0.0068] 0.0043 [0.0041, 0.0045]




∗Here and henceforward 95% conﬁdence intervals in square brackets
39Figure A.3: “Aggregate Wage Oﬀer Densities: Homogeneous Firms”
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Figure A.4: “Theoretical Earnings Densities Predicted by the Model: Homogeneous
Firms”
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40Table A.2: “Estimation Results: 3-Point Employer Heterogeneity”
Speciﬁcation
Constant Returns Increasing Returns
κu1 5.6156 [4.9973, 6.2339] κu1 5.9612 [5.2742, 6.6481]
κu2 9.9702 [9.1169, 10.8234] κu2 10.6176 [9.6662, 11.5691]
κu3 17.0121 [14.8258, 19.1985] κu3 18.0656 [15.6320, 20.4991]
κe 2.1277 [1.9869, 2.2684] κe 3.6432 [3.3926, 3.8939]
δ 0.0047 [0.0045, 0.0049] δ 0.0042 [0.0040, 0.0044]
ξ1 1.0381 [1.0324, 1.0437]
ξ2 1.3961 [1.2977, 1.4945]
ξ3 4.9201 [3.1342, 6.7060]
{αij} j =1 j =2 j =3 {αij} j =1 j =2 j =3
i =1 0 .1772 0.1449 0.1499 i =1 0 .1896 0.2466 0.9822
i =2 0 .4622 0.4939 0.5212 i =2 0 .4850 0.6586 2.4929
{wij} j =1 j =2 {wij} j =1 j =2
i = 1 4431 5698 i = 1 4431 5698
i = 2 5065 7597 i = 2 5065 6964
i = 3 6964 9992 i = 3 6964 9992
j =1 j =2 j =1 j =2
γj 0.7905 0.9610 γj 0.8485 0.9685
ln(L) −65059.96 ln(L) −64843.50
41Figure A.5: “Aggregate Wage Oﬀer Densities: 3-Point Employer Heterogeneity”
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Figure A.6: “Theoretical Earnings Densities Predicted by the Model: 3-Point Employer
Heterogeneity”
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The second order Taylor-Expansion of the production function around rj is given by








i σij [hj (w) − 1]
2 .
Note, that hj (w) is independent of the skill group i, because of equation (12). Using the
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According to the result that all ﬁrms occupy the same position in all wage oﬀer distri-
bution, changing the wage for one skill group implies a change of all other wages in the
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Using a Taylor-Expansion for the ﬁrst derivative of the production function and substi-
tuting ll (wl) out gives
Y
0







(rljhj (w) − rlj).
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Apart from this a special cases appear if
¡
Y 0
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rij − σij > 0.( A . 5 )





















In order to see that the wage oﬀer density can be increasing and decreasing consider the
























































Thus, a necessary condition for the wage oﬀer density to be upward sloping is that
¡
Y 0
j (rj) − wi
¢
rij − σij > 0. Substituting σij, and using the Euler Theorem gives the
stated condition.
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